Philosophical Studies

, Volume 129, Issue 3, pp 545–574 | Cite as

Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism

  • Øystein LinneboEmail author


Since Benacerraf’s “Mathematical Truth” a number of epistemological challenges have been launched against mathematical platonism. I first argue that these challenges fail because they unduely assimilate mathematics to empirical science. Then I develop an improved challenge which is immune to this criticism. Very roughly, what I demand is an account of how people’s mathematical beliefs are responsive to the truth of these beliefs. Finally I argue that if we employ a semantic truth-predicate rather than just a deflationary one, there surprisingly turns out to be logical space for a response to the improved challenge where no such space appeared to exist.


Mathematical Object Natural Response Perceptual Belief Mathematical Truth Counterfactual Dependence 
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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Merton CollegeOxfordUK

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