Agency, perception, space and subjectivity

  • Rick GrushEmail author
  • Alison Springle


The goal of this paper is to illuminate the connections between agency, perception, subjectivity, space and the body. Such connections have been the subject matter of much philosophical work. For example, the importance of the body and bodily action on perception is a growth area in philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, there are some key relations that, as will become clear, have not been adequately explored. We start by examining the relation between embodiment and agency, especially the dependence of agency on perception and the dependence of perception on agency. We also consider the nature of subjectivity itself: In virtue of what do humans and animals but not rocks and pencils have genuine perceptual and agentive intentional contents? We sketch a hylomorphic account of subjects and subjectivity, which highlights connections between the conclusions argued for in the previous sections and some basic principles of teleosemantics.


Space Perception Agency Embodiment Subjectivity Objectivity Inverse mappings 


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUC San DiegoLa JollaUSA
  2. 2.University of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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