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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 455–460 | Cite as

Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (Eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology

MIT Press, 2013, 432 pages, ISBN 0262019205, $40.22
  • Rami AliEmail author
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  • 487 Downloads

Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology is an edited MIT press collection that contributes to the (analytic) philosophy of perception. This collection is a significant addition to the literature both for its excellent choice of texts, and its emphasis on the case of hallucinations. Dedicating a volume to hallucinatory phenomena may seem somewhat peculiar for those not entrenched in the analytic philosophy of perception, but it is easy enough to grasp their significance. Theories of perception aim to give a fundamental characterization of perceptual experience, which are experiences with a sensory phenomenal character. Such perceptual experiences (henceforth experiences) include cases of successfully perceiving something, but also some cases of merely seeming to perceive. This is because prima facie, some cases of seeming to perceive are more than merely thinking that one does (such cases would be instances of thought not perception); they are cases of misperceiving. Hallucinations...

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of HumanitiesLebanese American UniversityBeirutLebanon

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