Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 47–73 | Cite as

The effects of social ties on coordination: conceptual foundations for an empirical analysis

  • Giuseppe Attanasi
  • Astrid Hopfensitz
  • Emiliano Lorini
  • Frédéric Moisan


This paper investigates the influence that social ties can have on behavior. After defining the concept of social ties that we consider, we introduce an original model of social ties. The impact of such ties on social preferences is studied in a coordination game with outside option. We provide a detailed game theoretical analysis of this game while considering various types of players, i.e., self-interest maximizing, inequity averse, and fair agents. In addition to these approaches that require strategic reasoning in order to reach some equilibrium, we also present an alternative hypothesis that relies on the concept of team reasoning. After having discussed the differences between the latter and our model of social ties, we show how an experiment can be designed so as to discriminate among the models presented in the paper.


Social ties Coordination Game theory Forward induction Social preferences Team reasoning 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Giuseppe Attanasi
    • 1
  • Astrid Hopfensitz
    • 2
  • Emiliano Lorini
    • 3
  • Frédéric Moisan
    • 4
  1. 1.Bureau d’Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA)Université de StrasbourgStrasbourgFrance
  2. 2.Toulouse School of EconomicsToulouseFrance
  3. 3.IRIT - CNRS, University of ToulouseToulouse Cedex 9France
  4. 4.IRIT, University of ToulouseToulouse Cedex 9France

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