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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp 437–460 | Cite as

The delocalized mind. Judgements, vehicles, and persons

  • Pierre SteinerEmail author
Article

Abstract

Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful entities (vehicles). Persons, who engage in social practices of deontic scorekeeping (Brandom), and who are thus able to produce appropriate inferential behaviour, enact conceptual mental episodes and the basis of their supervenience.

Keywords

Conceptual mental episodes Delocalized mind Judgements Vehicles Persons 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.COSTECHUniversité de Technologie de Compiègne/Sorbonne UniversitéCompiègneFrance

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