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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 295–312 | Cite as

Crossing the bridge: the first-person and time

  • Patrick StokesEmail author
Article

Abstract

Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the importance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspectives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenomenologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the first-person perspective, and thereby resist the assumption that phenomenally-figured and theoretically-figured identity claims must have a common object, the metaphysically awkward accommodations each of these authors is compelled to make cease to be necessary.

Keywords

Personal identity Reflexivity Barry Dainton Galen Strawson Bridge problem 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Humanities and Social SciencesDeakin UniversityBurwoodAustralia

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