Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 12, Issue 3, pp 465–483

Brentano on the dual relation of the mental

Article

Abstract

Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind.

Keywords

Brentano Inner consciousness Immediate evidence Judgement 

References

  1. Barwise, J. (1981). Scenes and other situations. The Journal of Philosophy, 78, 369–397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bergmann, H. (1908). Untersuchungen zum Problem der Evidenz Inneren Wahrnehmung. Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer.Google Scholar
  3. Brandl, J. (2010). Brentano’s Theory of Judgement. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Google Scholar
  4. Brandl, J. (2011). What is Pre-reflective Self-Awareness? Brentano’s Theory of Inner Consciousness reconsidered. Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, 1, 41–61.Google Scholar
  5. Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt. Hamburg 1955: Meiner. Trans.: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London 1995: Routledge (trans. L. MacAlister).Google Scholar
  6. Brentano, F. (1883). Miklosisch über subjektlose Sätze. In his Vom Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot 1889.Google Scholar
  7. Brentano, F. (1887). Deskriptive Psychologie. In R. M. Chisholm & M. Baumgartner (eds.), Hamburg: Meiner 1982. Trans.: Descriptive Psychology, London 1995: Routledge (trans. B. Mueller).Google Scholar
  8. Brentano, F. (1905). Über das sogennante “immanente (intentionale)” Objekt. (Letter to Anton Marty). In: Brentano 1930. (pp. 87–9)Google Scholar
  9. Brentano, F. (1911). Von der Klassifikation der Psychischen Phänomene. Neue, durch Nachträge stark vermehrte Ausgabe der betreffenden Kapitel der Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.Google Scholar
  10. Brentano, F. (1930). Wahrheit und Evidenz. In O. Kraus (Ed.), Reprint Hamburg: Meiner 1974.Google Scholar
  11. Brentano, F. (1956). Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil. In F. Mayer-Hillebrand (Ed.), Bern: Franke.Google Scholar
  12. Brentano, F. (1959). Grundzüge der Ästhetik. In F. Meyer-Hillebrand (Ed.), Hamburg: Meiner.Google Scholar
  13. Caston, V. (1998). Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58, 249–298.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Caston, V. (2002). Aristotle on Consciousness. Mind, 111, 751–815.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Chrudzimski, A., & Smith, B. (2004). Brentano’s ontology: from conceptualism to reism. In D. Jacquette (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano (pp. 197–220). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Hamilton, W. (1836). Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic I. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons.Google Scholar
  17. Hellie, B. (2007). Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance. Philosophical Studies, 134, 289–324.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Hossack, K. (2002). Self-knowledge and consciousness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102, pp. 163–181Google Scholar
  19. Janzen, G. (2008). The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  20. Johnston, M. (2007). Objective minds and the objectivity of our minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85, 233–267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Kriegel, U. (2003). Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33, 103–132.Google Scholar
  22. Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Kriegel, U. 2012. Brentano’s most striking Thesis. In D. Fisette & G. Frechette (Eds.), Themes from Brentano. Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  24. Kuroda, S.-Y. (1975). The categorical and thetic judgement. Foundations of Language, 9, 153–185.Google Scholar
  25. Lehrer, K. (2008) Consciousness and the regress. Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 6, 45–57.Google Scholar
  26. Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In P. H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press 1979.Google Scholar
  27. Marty, A. (1884). Über subjektlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zur Logik und Psychologie. Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 8, 56–94. Reprinted in his Gesammelte Schriften II. Eisenmeier et al (ed.). Halle an der Saale: Verlag Max Niemeyer 1918.Google Scholar
  28. Marty, A. (2011). In M. Antonelli & J. H. Marek (Eds.), Deskriptive Psychologie. Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann.Google Scholar
  29. Mulligan, K. (2004). Brentano on the Mind. In D. Jacquette (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano (pp. 66–97). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Reid, T. (1785). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. In D. R. Brookes & K. Haakonssen (eds.), Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press 2002.Google Scholar
  31. Rosenthal, D. (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  32. Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. Reprint 2001. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  33. Siewert, C. (2001). Self-Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity. Noûs, 35, 542–568.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Simmons, A. (2001). Changing the Cartesian mind: Leibniz on sensation, representation and consciousness. The Philosophical Review, 110, 31–75.Google Scholar
  35. Simons, P. (2004). Judging correctly: Brentano and the Reform of Elementary Logic. In D. Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano (pp. 45–65). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  36. Stumpf, C. (1919). Reminiscences of Brentano. Reprinted In L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano. London: Duckworth 1976.Google Scholar
  37. Textor, M. (2006). Brentano (and some Neo-Brentanians) on inner consciousness. Dialectica, 60, 411–431.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. von Hartmann, E. (1869). Philosophie des Unbewussten. Berlin.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKing’s College LondonLondonUK

Personalised recommendations