Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 423–430 | Cite as

Review of Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism

Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (Eds) Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (Oxford University Press, Oxford), 2011, vii-212
Article
  • 181 Downloads

References

  1. Brandom, R. (1994). Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing and discursive commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Brandom, R. (2000). Articulating reasons: An introduction to inferentialism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Davidson, D. (1974). On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47, 5–20. Reprinted in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, (pp. 183–98). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.Google Scholar
  4. Haddock, A. (2011). Davidson and idealism. In J. Smith & P. Sullivan (Eds.), Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (pp. 26–41). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Kant, I. (1781/7). Critique of pure reason. Translated by N. Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan Press, 1929Google Scholar
  6. Kitcher, P. (2011). The Unity of Kant’s Active Thinker. In J. Smith & P. Sullivan (Eds.), Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (pp. 55–73). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Kornblith, H. (2011). Reasons, naturalism, and transcendental philosophy. In J. Smith & P. Sullivan (Eds.), Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (pp. 96–119). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Lear, J. (1982). Leaving the world alone. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 382–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Maddy, P. (2011). Naturalism, transcendentalism, and therapy. In J. Smith & P. Sullivan (Eds.), Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (pp. 120–156). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. McDowell, J. (1996). Mind and world, with a new introduction by the author. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Moore, A. W. (2011). Vats, sets, and tits. In J. Smith & P. Sullivan (Eds.), Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (pp. 41–54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Skinner, B. F., & Ferster, C. (1957). Schedules of reinforcement. New York: Appleton Century Crofts.Google Scholar
  13. Smith, J. (2011). Strawson on other minds. In J. Smith & P. Sullivan (Eds.), Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (pp. 184–208). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Smith, J., & Sullivan, P. (2011). Introduction: Transcendental philosophy and naturalism. In J. Smith & P. Sullivan (Eds.), Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (pp. 1–25). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Stern, R. (2011). The value of humanity: Reflections on Korsgaard’s transcendental argument. In J. Smith & P. Sullivan (Eds.), Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (pp. 74–95). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Stroud, B. (1968). Transcendental arguments. Journal of Philosophy, 65, 241–256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Sullivan, P. (2011). Is logic transcendental? In J. Smith & P. Sullivan (Eds.), Transcendental philosophy and naturalism (pp. 157–183). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Wittgenstein, L. (1953), Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. London: BlackwellGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of YorkHeslington, YorkUK

Personalised recommendations