Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 541–563

Dynamic Embodied Cognition

Article

Abstract

In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes in explaining some cases of social interaction—not yet up to the task. This is because they (1) do not pay sufficient attention to the role of offline processing or “decoupling”, and (2) obscure the cognitive gap by overemphasizing the role of phenomenology. We argue that the main challenge for the enactive view will be to acknowledge the importance of both coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes for basic and advanced forms of (social) cognition. To meet this challenge, we articulate a dynamic embodied view of cognition. We illustrate the fruitfulness of this approach by recourse to recent findings on false belief understanding.

Keywords

Social cognition Enactivism Embodied cognition Cognitive gap False belief understanding 

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy IIRuhr-University BochumBochumGermany

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