Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 449–466

Implicit mindreading and embodied cognition

Article

Abstract

In this paper, I examine the plausibility of Embodied Accounts of Social Cognition by finding fault with the most detailed and convincing version of such an account, as articulated by Daniel Hutto (2008). I argue that this account fails to offer a plausible ontogeny for folk psychological abilities due to its inability to address recent evidence from implicit false belief tasks that suggest a radically different timeline for the development of these abilities.

Keywords

Embodied cognition Theory of Mind False belief Social cognition Development 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and ReligionMississippi State UniversityMississippi StateUSA

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