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The metaepistemology of knowing-how

  • Cheng-hung TsaiEmail author
Article

Abstract

Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, second, by introducing and elaborating the concept of hybrid knowing-how, which entails a combination of a ground-level ability and a meta-level perspective on that ability. The stance I wish to advocate is that the epistemology of knowing-how is a normative discipline whose main task is to study the nature and value of human practical intelligence required to do things in a particular manner.

Keywords

Intelligence Knowledge Ability Hybrid knowing-how Consciousness Epistemic luck Normativity 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Daisy Ku, Cheng-hung Lin, Norman Teng, Linton Wang, and the members of the Knowledge, Virtue, and Intuition Project at Soochow University, in particular Michael Mi, Hsiang-min Shen, and Zhi-hue Wang, for helpful discussions. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences for critical and constructive comments that significantly improved the manuscript. This work was supported by the National Science Council (NSC 98-2410-H-031-002-MY3 and NSC 99-2410-H-031-009-MY3) and in part by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (RG003-D-08).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySoochow UniversityTaipeiTaiwan

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