Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp 579–603 | Cite as

The value of cognitivism in thinking about extended cognition



This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.


Cognitivism Extended cognition Coupling-constitution fallacy Non-derived content Mental representation 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Linguistics and Cognitive ScienceUniversity of DelawareNewarkUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyCentenary College of LouisianaShreveportUSA

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