Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 8, Issue 2, pp 267–273 | Cite as

A review of Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, The Bounds of Cognition

REVIEW OF: The Bounds of Cognition, Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, 2008, Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
  • Lawrence A. ShapiroEmail author
Book Review


In The Bounds of Cognition, Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa treat the arguments for extended cognition to withering criticism. I summarize their main arguments and focus special attention on their distinction between the extended cognitive system hypothesis and the extended cognition hypothesis, as well as on their demand for a mark of the mental.


Cognition Extended cognition Embodied cognition Intentionality 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Wisconsin-MadisonMadisonUSA

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