Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 159–175

Why the idea of framework propositions cannot contribute to an understanding of delusions

Regular Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-007-9079-6

Cite this article as:
Thornton, T. Phenom Cogn Sci (2008) 7: 159. doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9079-6

Abstract

One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent epistemic features of primary delusions, their role in partially constituting the sense of inquiry rules out their role in helping to understand delusions.

Keywords

Philosophy of psychiatry Wittgenstein On Certainty Eilan Campbell Maher Frith 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Philosophy, Diversity and Mental HealthUniversity of Central LancashirePrestonUK

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