Moral phenomenology: Foundational issues

Original Paper


In this paper, I address the what, the how, and the why of moral phenomenology. I consider first the question What is moral phenomenology?, secondly the question How to pursue moral phenomenology?, and thirdly the question Why pursue moral phenomenology? My treatment of these questions is preliminary and tentative, and is meant not so much to settle them as to point in their answers’ direction.


Moral phenomenology First-person perspective Meta-ethics Normative ethics Cognitive science 



I would like to thank the Rockefeller Foundation for very generous support in pursuit of this project, including both this paper and this entire special issue. For extremely useful comments on a previous draft, I am indebted to Mark Timmons, and for many enlightening conversations on moral phenomenology, to Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of SydneySydneyAustralia
  2. 2.University of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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