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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 309–311 | Cite as

Response to Selinger on Dreyfus

  • Harry M. CollinsEmail author
Article

Abstract

My claim is clear and unambiguous: no machine will pass a well-designed Turing Test unless we find some means of embedding it in lived social life. We have no idea how to do this but my argument, and all our evidence, suggests that it will not be a necessary condition that the machine have more than a minimal body. Exactly how minimal is still being worked out.

Key words

embodiment Turing Test GOFAI Selinger Dreyfus 

References

  1. Collins, H. M. (2004). Interactional expertise as a third kind of knowledge, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3/2, 125–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Collins, H. M., & Evans, R. (2007). Rethinking expertise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (in press)Google Scholar
  3. Collins, H. M. Evans, R., Ribeiro, R., & Hall, M. (2006). Experiments with interactional expertise. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37A/4, 656–674, (December).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Selinger, E., Dreyfus, H., & Collins, H. (2008). Embodiment of interactional expertise. In H. M. Collins (Ed.), Case Studies of Expertise and Experience: Special Issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 39(1) (in press).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.KES, Cardiff School of Social SciencesCardiff UniversityCardiffUK

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