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Heterophenomenology reconsidered

  • Daniel C. DennettEmail author
Article

Descartes’ Method of Radical Doubt was not radical enough. –A. Marcel (2003, 181)

In short, heterophenomenology is nothing new; it is nothing other than the method that has been used by psychophysicists, cognitive psychologists, clinical neuropsychologists, and just about everybody who has ever purported to study human consciousness in a serious, scientific way. –D. Dennett (2003, 22)

I am grateful to Alva Noë for organizing this most stimulating and informative congregation of essays. They have opened my eyes to aspects of my own work, and the different contexts into which it must be shoehorned, and forced me to articulate, and revise, points about which I have been less than clear. Instead of providing seriatim answers to each essay, I am running my reactions together, taking advantage of the contexts they provide for each other, and concentrating on a few themes that emerged again and again. I apologize to those whose essays are given at most a glancing response; typically I found...

Key words

heterophenomenology autophenomenology cognitive science 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTufts UniversityMedfordUSA

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