Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 6, Issue 1–2, pp 231–245

The critique of pure phenomenology

Article

Abstract

The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.

Key words

phenomenology epistemological autonomy first-person methodology theory introspection 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA

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