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Look again: Phenomenology and mental imagery

  • Evan Thompson
Original Article

Abstract

This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.

Key words

mental imagery consciousness phenomenology neurophenomenology heterophenomenology 

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© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

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