Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 89–118

The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

Article

Abstract

A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is “immune to error through misidentification.” To this end, the body's double involvement in consciousness is considered: it can experience objects intentionally and itself non-intentionally. Specifically, pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness, by contrast with the consciousness of the body that happens to be one's own, consists in experiencing one's body as the point of convergence of action and perception. Neither proprioception alone nor intention alone is sufficient to underlie this pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness. Rather, it is made possible thanks to a sensori-motor integration, allowing a sensitivity to the sensory consequences of one's action, through action monitoring.

Keywords

body immunity to error through misidentification pre-reflective consciousness self sensori-motricity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CREA, Centre de Recherche en Epistémologie AppliquéeParisFrance

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