Redenomination Risk and Bank Runs in a Monetary Union with and Without Deposit Insurance Schemes

  • Paolo CanofariEmail author
  • Alessandra Marcelletti
  • Marcello Messori
Research Article


This paper develops a basic framework characterized by a monetary union in which a shock to the policy interest rate, i.e. the determinant of a recessionary stance in the monetary policy, can imply that a member state finds it worthwhile to leave this union and/or that the corresponding banks declare bankruptcy. Our aim is to analyze the various possible reactions that bank depositors may have when this shock is transmitted to the interest rates on their bank deposits. We compare these reactions in two different policy frameworks characterized either by the presence or by the absence of a Centralized Deposit Insurance Scheme (CDIS). Our model shows that the introduction of a CDIS is per se not sufficient for zeroing the probability of bank runs.


Bank run Monetary union Euro breakup Redenomination risk 

JEL Classification

F30 F31 F41 G01 



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paolo Canofari
    • 1
    Email author
  • Alessandra Marcelletti
    • 1
  • Marcello Messori
    • 1
  1. 1.Luiss School of European Political Economy (SEP)RomeItaly

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