# Market Coordination Under Non-Equilibrium Dynamics

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## Abstract

In order to study the market coordination under non-equilibrium dynamics, such as the one outlined in catallactics, we consider a multi-agent system with fixed topology, based upon a Hamiltonian structure, subject to flocking behavior. The assumptions of market segmentation and of imperfect competition are introduced. We show that the catallactic framework leads to the emergence of a stable market coordination, but is also a dissipative structure of cyclical nature, such that imperfect competition gives rise to a pseudo-competitive market. In case of risk-sharing, we find that catallactics yields an unstable trading system, which transforms the market risk into a systemic risk.

## Keywords

Network economics Agent-based modeling Catallactics Flocking behavior Risk-sharing## Notes

### Acknowledgment

The author would like to thank François Delarue (CNRS, Université Nice Sophia Antipolis), for his valuable comments on this work, as well as the discussants from CentraleSupélec Laboratory of Mathematics in Interaction with Computer Science (MICS). He is also grateful to the anonymous referees and to the editor for their thorough comments and suggestions, which significantly contributed to improving the quality of the paper.

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