Networks and Spatial Economics

, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp 427–454 | Cite as

Optimal Two-Part Pricing and Capacity Allocation with Multiple User Classes and Elastic Arrivals at Constrained Transportation Facilities

Article

Abstract

This paper focuses on the joint determination of optimal two-part prices and optimal capacity allocation at transportation facilities with elastic arrivals of multiple user classes. The model considers a general cost function and a two-part tariff comprised of an entrance fee and a dwell charge for use of the facility. Examples of this type of decision problems include: parking lots, airline seat allocation, and area congestion pricing schemes, among others. The results indicate that, in general, the optimal prices for the major pricing rules (i.e., profit maximization or welfare maximization) have three main components: one that captures the contributions of the willingness to pay and marginal costs, i.e., the classic solution; one that reflects the role of capacity constraint; and another that captures the role of elastic arrivals. Both welfare maximizing and second best prices have an additional term that accounts for the effect on consumer surplus produced by the dwell charges through the arrival rates. The models developed demonstrate the existence of a new dimension, namely cross-effects among the optimal prices and the underlying demand functions. The theoretical analyses in the paper were complemented with numerical calculations to provide a context for the discussion.

Keywords

Price differentiation theory Inverse elasticity rule Optimal pricing Congestion pricing Intermodal transportation Elastic arrivals 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This paper has benefited from insightful comments and suggestions made by a number of colleagues that, needless to say, are not to blame for any of its shortcomings: Professors Herbert Mohring (University of Minnesota), Ross Weiner (City College of New York), Kazuya Kawamura (University of Illinois at Chicago), and Kara Kockelman (University of Texas at Austin) for their invaluable comments and constructive criticisms; and to Mr. Anupam Narayan for helping out with the numerical computations. The research on which the paper was based was supported by the National Science Foundation grants CAREER 0245165 and CMS 0324380, the Fondecyt (Chile) Grant 1080140 and the Millennium Institute on Complex Engineering Systems.

References

  1. Baumol W, Bradford D (1970) Optimal departure from marginal cost pricing. Am Econ Rev 60(3):265–283Google Scholar
  2. Bianchi R, Jara-Díaz SR, de D. Ortúzar J (1998) Modelling new pricing strategies for the Santiago Metro. Transp Policy 5:223–232. doi: 10.1016/S0967-070X(98)00025-0
  3. Boiteux M (1956) Sur la gestion des monopoles publics astreints à l’equilibre budgetaire in Econometrica Vol (24) 1, January 1956, pp. 22–40Google Scholar
  4. Boiteux M (1971) On the management of public monopolies subject to budgetary constraints. J Econ Theory 3:219–240. doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(71)90020-2 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Gleister S, Lewis D (1978) An integrated fares policy for transport in LondonGoogle Scholar
  6. Holguín-Veras J, Jara-Díaz S (1999) Optimal space allocation and pricing for priority service at container ports. Transp Res Part B 33(2):81–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Holguín-Veras J, Jara-Díaz S (2006) Preliminary insights into optimal pricing and space allocation at intermodal terminals with elastic arrivals and capacity constraint. Netw Spat Econ 6(1):25–38. doi: 10.1007/s11067-006-7683-6 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Hotelling H (1938) The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of railway and utility rates. Econometrica 6:242–269. doi: 10.2307/1907054 Google Scholar
  9. Jansson JO (1984) Transport system optimization and pricing. Wiley, ChichesterGoogle Scholar
  10. Jara-Díaz SR, Tovar B, Trujillo L (2005) Multioutput analysis of cargo handling firms: an application to a Spanish Port. Transportation 32:275–291. doi: 10.1007/s11116-004-8242-y CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Jara-Díaz SR, Martínez-Budría E, Díaz-Hernández JJ (2006) Multiple outputs in port cost functions. In Port Economics, Research in Transportation Economics Vol. 16, W. Talley y K. Cullinane, Elsevier, Netherland, 67-84Google Scholar
  12. Karush W (1939) Minima of functions of several variables with inequalities as side conditions. M.S. Thesis, Department of Mathematics, University of ChicagoGoogle Scholar
  13. Kuhn HW, Tucker AW (1951) Nonlinear programming. In: Neyman J (ed) Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium. University of California Press, Berkeley, pp 481–492Google Scholar
  14. Lindsey R, Verhoef ET (2001) Traffic congestion and congestion pricing. In: Button K, Hensher D (ed) Handbook of transport systems and traffic control. Pergamon, pp 77-105Google Scholar
  15. Manne AS (1972) Multiple-purpose public enterprises—criteria for pricing. Economica 19(75):322–326. doi: 10.2307/2550660 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Oi W (1971) A Disneyland Dilemma: two-part tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly. Q J Econ 85(1):77–96. doi: 10.2307/1881841 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Phlips L (1983) The economics of price discrimination. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MassachusettsGoogle Scholar
  18. Ramsey F (1927) A contribution on the theory of taxation. Econ J 37:47–61. doi: 10.2307/2222721 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Tovar B, Trujillo L, Jara-Díaz S (2004) Organization and regulation of the port industry: Europe and Spain. In: Coto-Millán P (ed) Essays on microeconomics and industrial organization. 2nd edn. Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, pp 189–207Google Scholar
  20. Vining E (1884) The necessity for a classification of freight and the principles upon which it is based. The Railway Review, XXIV(42). ChicagoGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rensselaer Polytechnic InstituteTroyUSA
  2. 2.Universidad de ChileSantiagoChile

Personalised recommendations