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A Common Frame for Formal Imagination

  • Joan Casas-RomaEmail author
  • M. Elena Rodríguez
  • Antonia Huertas
Article
  • 76 Downloads

Abstract

In this paper, we review three influential theories of imagination in order to understand how the dynamics of imagination acts could be modeled using formal languages. While reviewing them, we notice that they are not detailed enough to account for all the mechanisms involved in creating and developing imaginary worlds. We claim those theories could be further refined into what we call the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, which defines a framework that can be used to study the dynamics of imagination using formal languages, and we support our claim by showing how the framework allows to model certain imagination acts step by step. Then, we introduce the Rhombus of Imagination, which is a visual tool that can be used in conjunction with our framework to study the procedural structure of different kinds of imagination acts and identify their dynamic properties.

Keywords

Imagination Dynamic imagination Reality-oriented development Imaginary worlds Formal models 

Notes

Acknowledgement

This work is funded by EC FP7 Grant 621403 (ERA Chair: Games Research Opportunities), Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (Grant No. EP/J004049), the project “Hybrid Intensional Logic” (Ref. FFI2013-47126-P) given by the Spanish “Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad” (MINECO) and a Doctoral Grant from the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Games Academy, Falmouth UniversityCornwallUK
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science, Multimedia and TelecommunicationUniversitat Oberta de CatalunyaBarcelonaSpain

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