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Minds and Machines

, Volume 28, Issue 2, pp 287–310 | Cite as

Rethinking Causality in Biological and Neural Mechanisms: Constraints and Control

  • Jason Winning
  • William Bechtel
Article

Abstract

Existing accounts of mechanistic causation are not suited for understanding causation in biological and neural mechanisms because they do not have the resources to capture the unique causal structure of control heterarchies. In this paper, we provide a new account on which the causal powers of mechanisms are grounded by time-dependent, variable constraints. Constraints can also serve as a key bridge concept between the mechanistic approach to explanation and underappreciated work in theoretical biology that sheds light on how biological systems channel energy to actively respond to the environment in adaptive ways, perform work, and fulfill the requirements to maintain themselves far from equilibrium. We show how the framework applies to several concrete examples of control in simple organisms as well as the nervous system of complex organisms.

Keywords

Mechanistic explanation Causal powers Constraints Dissipative structures Heterarchical control Biological autonomy 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive ScienceUniversity of California, San DiegoLa JollaUSA
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy, Center for Circadian Biology, and Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive ScienceUniversity of California, San DiegoLa JollaUSA

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