Minds and Machines

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 199–231 | Cite as

The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing \(\varphi \vee \psi\) as a desire means to desire \(\varphi\) and to desire \(\psi\). However, desiring \(\varphi\) and \(\lnot \varphi\) at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals.

Keywords

Desire Revision Possibility theory 
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Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the referees for a careful reading and insightful remarks, that led us to clarify a number of issues in the paper, in particular, the shaping of the proof of the completeness Theorem 1.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IRIT-CNRSUniversité Paul SabatierToulouse Cedex 09France

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