Minds and Machines

, Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 119–122 | Cite as

Stanley B. Klein: The Two Selves—Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, xx + 153, £25.00, ISBN: 987-0-19-934996-8
  • Kourken Michaelian
Book Review

The main claim of this relatively brief but unusually ambitious book is, as the title suggests, that the self is not one but two. On the one hand, there is the epistemological self, which has a definite neurocognitive basis. On the other hand, there is the ontological self, which, in Klein’s view, is a matter of first-person subjectivity and may lack a material basis, in which case it may, in contrast to the epistemological self, not be amenable to investigation by standard scientific means.1The suggestion that the self may include an immaterial component is likely to strike many readers as, at best, highly improbable. Thus it is worth noting at the outset that the author is careful to present the immateriality claim as an hypothesis (though one that he clearly favours), acknowledging that it is not a conclusion entailed by the empirical research that he reviews. Indeed, the core of the book’s treatment of the plural character of the self is independent of the immateriality claim, in...

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBilkent UniversityAnkara Turkey

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