Minds and Machines

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 339–352 | Cite as

The Mark of the Cognitive

Article

Abstract

It is easy to give a list of cognitive processes. They are things like learning, memory, concept formation, reasoning, maybe emotion, and so on. It is not easy to say, of these things that are called cognitive, what makes them so? Knowing the answer is one very important reason to be interested in the mark of the cognitive. In this paper, consider some answers that we think do not work and then offer one of our own which ties cognition to actions explained via the having of reasons.

Keywords

Cognition Cognitive processing Reasons Information Representation Function 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We want to thank all those who attended the University of Delaware Cognitive and Neuroscience Workshop in September 2011 for helpful comments. Additional thanks to Ken Aizawa, Gary Fulller, and John A. Barker for helpful suggestions. We thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments. We also thank the University of Delaware's Office of Undergraduate Research for support for this project.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of DelawareNewarkUSA

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