Minds and Machines

, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 423–439

Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind

Article

Abstract

We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.

Keywords

Mechanism Church’s thesis Computational theory of mind Dualism Inferentialism Platonism Lucas-Penrose argument Brandom Dummett Detlefsen Wright 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLouisiana State UniversityBaton RougeUSA
  2. 2.NorfolkUSA

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