Minds and Machines

, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 423–439 | Cite as

Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind

  • Jon CogburnEmail author
  • Jason Megil


We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.


Mechanism Church’s thesis Computational theory of mind Dualism Inferentialism Platonism Lucas-Penrose argument Brandom Dummett Detlefsen Wright 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLouisiana State UniversityBaton RougeUSA
  2. 2.NorfolkUSA

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