Minds and Machines

, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 349–362 | Cite as

Could a Created Being Ever be Creative? Some Philosophical Remarks on Creativity and AI Development

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Abstract

Creativity has a special role in enabling humans to develop beyond the fulfilment of simple primary functions. This factor is significant for Artificial Intelligence (AI) developers who take replication to be the primary goal, since moves toward creating autonomous artificial-beings beg questions about their potential for creativity. Using Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following and language-games, I argue that although some AI programs appear creative, to call these programmed acts creative in our terms is to misunderstand the use of this word in language. I conclude that replication is not the best way forward for AI development in matters of creativity.

Keywords

Creativity AI Philosophy Wittgenstein Rule-following Language-games 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of WolverhamptonWolverhamptonUK
  2. 2.PhilosophySt. Mary’s University CollegeTwickenhamUK

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