Minds and Machines

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 101–115 | Cite as

Is There a Future for AI Without Representation?

Article

Abstract

This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks’ proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of “new AI” (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: “New AI” is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents—Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of the image of intelligent agents as central representation processors. If this paradigm shift is achieved, Brooks’ proposal for cognition without representation appears promising for full-blown intelligent agents—Though not for conscious agents.

Keywords

AI Artificial intelligence Brooks Central control Computationalism Function Embodiment Grounding Representation Representationalism Subsumption architecture 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.American College of ThessalonikiPylaiaGreece

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