Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

, Volume 31, Issue 4, pp 303–315 | Cite as

The metaphysical basis of a liberal organ procurement policy

Article

Abstract

There remains a need to properly analyze the metaphysical assumptions underlying two organ procurement policies: presumed consent and organ sales. Our contention is that if one correctly understands the metaphysics of both the human body and material property, then it will turn out that while organ sales are illiberal, presumed consent is not. What we mean by illiberal includes violating rights of bodily integrity, property, or autonomy, as well as arguing for or against a policy in a manner that runs afoul of Rawlsian public reason.

Keywords

Presumed consent Bodily integrity Public reason 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University at BuffaloBuffaloUSA
  2. 2.Niagara UniversityNiagaraUSA

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