Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

, Volume 31, Issue 4, pp 285–301 | Cite as

Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning



We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism—the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.


Animalism Personal identity Dicephalus Craniopagus parasiticus Cephalopagus Too-many-subjects problem 



We are grateful to Jacob Ross and Dean Zimmerman for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyRutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA

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