Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

, Volume 30, Issue 2, pp 105–129

“Other selves”: moral and legal proposals regarding the personhood of cryopreserved human embryos


DOI: 10.1007/s11017-009-9099-z

Cite this article as:
Brugger, E.C. Theor Med Bioeth (2009) 30: 105. doi:10.1007/s11017-009-9099-z


This essay has two purposes. The first is to argue that our moral duties towards human embryos should be assessed in light of the Golden Rule by asking the normative question, “how would I want to be treated if I were an embryo?” Some reject the proposition “I was an embryo” on the basis that embryos should not be recognized as persons. This essay replies to five common arguments denying the personhood of human embryos: (1) that early human embryos lack ontological individuation; (2) that they are members of the species Homo sapiens but not yet human persons; (3) that the argument for personhood commits the “heap argument” fallacy; (4) that since human procreation in nature is inefficient, human embryos cannot be persons; and (5) the “burning building” scenario proves that all arguments for personhood are irrational or inconsistent. The second purpose is to set forth and criticize in light of the normative judgement defended in part one the present legal situation of cryo-preserved embryos in the U.S. The essay ends by proposing legislative reforms to protect ex utero human embryos.


Human embryo Personhood Embryo experimentation Cryo-preserved embryos Frozen embryos Human rights In vitro fertilization Assisted reproductive technology 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Saint John Vianney Theological SeminaryDenverUSA

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