Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp 375–394

Ethics and the Science of Animal Minds

OriginalPaper

Abstract

Ethicists have commonly appealed to science to bolster their arguments for elevating the moral status of nonhuman animals. I describe a framework within which I take many ethicists to be making such appeals. I focus on an apparent gap in this framework between those properties of animals that are part of the scientific consensus, and those to which ethicists typically appeal in their arguments. I will describe two different ways of diminishing the appearance of the gap, and argue that both of them present challenges to ethicists seeking a firm scientific basis for their claims about the moral status of animals. I argue that more clarity about the role of appeals to science by applied ethicists leads to questions about the effectiveness of such appeals, and that these questions might best be pursued empirically.

Keywords

animal ethics moral status animal minds animals and science cognitive ethology 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of History & Philosophy of ScienceIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA

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