Metascience

, Volume 21, Issue 2, pp 269–294 | Cite as

Science and mathematics: the scope and limits of mathematical fictionalism

Mary Leng: Mathematics and reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, x+278pp, £39.00 HB
  • Christopher Pincock
  • Alan Baker
  • Alexander Paseau
  • Mary Leng
Book Symposium
  • 228 Downloads

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher Pincock
    • 1
  • Alan Baker
    • 2
  • Alexander Paseau
    • 3
  • Mary Leng
    • 4
  1. 1.University of MissouriColumbiaUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophySwarthmore CollegeSwarthmoreUSA
  3. 3.Wadham CollegeOxfordUK
  4. 4.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of YorkHeslington, YorkUK

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