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Continental Philosophy Review

, Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 143–160 | Cite as

Self and other: from pure ego to co-constituted we

  • Dan ZahaviEmail author
Article

Abstract

In recent years, the social dimensions of selfhood have been discussed widely. Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? These questions are explored in the following contribution.

Keywords

Selfhood First-person perspective Empathy Intersubjectivity Second-person perspective taking We-identity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Subjectivity ResearchUniversity of CopenhagenCopenhagen SDenmark

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