Continental Philosophy Review

, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 367–383 | Cite as

DeLanda’s ontology: assemblage and realism

  • Graham HarmanEmail author


Manuel DeLanda is one of the few admitted realists in present-day continental philosophy, a position he claims to draw from Deleuze. DeLanda conceives of the world as made up of countless layers of assemblages, irreducible to their parts and never dissolved into larger organic wholes. This article supports DeLanda’s position as a refreshing new model for continental thought. It also criticizes his movement away from singular individuals toward disembodied attractors and topological structures lying outside all specific beings. While endorsing DeLanda’s realism, I reject his shift from the actual to the virtual.


DeLanda Realism Virtual Assemblage Essence 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyAmerican University in CairoCairoEgypt

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