Continental Philosophy Review

, Volume 38, Issue 1–2, pp 71–88

Naturalising deconstruction

Article

Abstract

Most contemporary readings of Derrida’s work situate it within a transcendental tradition of philosophical enquiry explicitly critical of naturalistic accounts of knowledge and mind. I argue that Derrida provides the naturalist with some of the philosophical resources needed to rebut transcendental critiques of naturalism, in particular the phenomenological critiques which derive from Husserl’s philosophy. I do this by showing: a) that Derrida’s account of temporality as differance undermines phenomenological accounts of the meaning of naturalistic theories and assumptions; and b) that it is itself both usable and interpretable within the naturalistic framework of current cognitive science.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe Open UniversityMilton KeynesUK

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