Journal of Management & Governance

, Volume 18, Issue 2, pp 315–345

Does shareholder protection affect the performance of analysts as a gatekeeper?

  • Christopher von Koch
  • Ola Nilsson
  • Katarina Eriksson
Article

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of shareholder protection on analysts’ performance. The important corporate governance role analysts can play by monitoring management has largely been ignored in the literature. Using a newly constructed index, we are for the first time able to analyse how changes in shareholder protection over time affect analysts’ performance as a gatekeeper. We find that strengthened shareholder protection improves analysts’ performance as a gatekeeper, i.e. analysts’ ability to reduce information asymmetry improves with strengthened shareholder protection. However, we also find a substitution effect: Strengthened shareholder protection makes analysts’ services less valuable to investors, thereby leading to a reduction in the number of analysts following firms.

Keywords

Shareholder protection Analysts Cross-section Forecast accuracy Forecast bias Forecast dispersion Panel 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher von Koch
    • 1
  • Ola Nilsson
    • 1
  • Katarina Eriksson
    • 1
  1. 1.Linnaeus School of Business and EconomicsLinnaeus UniversityVäxjöSweden

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