Journal of Management & Governance

, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp 73–91 | Cite as

The effects of board size and ‘busy’ directors on the market value of Italian companies

Article

Abstract

This paper presents evidence that corporate governance quality measured by (1) the board size and (2) the fraction of directors that serve on more corporate boards, influences the market value of firms. The analysis is based in Italy, a country that is characterized by family and concentrated ownership, low legal protection of investors and pyramidal firm structures. Our empirical results suggest that the level of ‘busy-ness’ of corporate directors as a measure of board effectiveness has a significant influence on firm’s market performance. By contrast, we find limited evidence that board size has a substantial impact on the market valuation, except in small and medium enterprises and in some specific industry sectors.

Keywords

Accounting valuation Corporate governance Board-of-directors’ size Number of directorships ‘Busy’ directors 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of SienaSienaItaly
  2. 2.CAIR, MBS, University of ManchesterManchesterUK
  3. 3.Cass Business SchoolLondonUK

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