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Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 11–35 | Cite as

Limits in the Revision Theory

More Than Just Definite Verdicts
  • Catrin Campbell-MooreEmail author
Open Access
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  • 228 Downloads

Abstract

We present a new proposal for what to do at limits in the revision theory. The usual criterion for a limit stage is that it should agree with any definite verdicts that have been brought about before that stage. We suggest that one should not only consider definite verdicts that have been brought about but also more general properties; in fact any closed property can be considered. This more general framework is required if we move to considering revision theories for concepts that are concerned with real numbers, but also has consequences for more traditional revision theories such as the revision theory of truth.

Keywords

Revision theory Self-reference Circular definitions Taking limits Probability 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Hannes Leitgeb, Johannes Stern, Seamus Bradley and Leon Horsten and for their helpful discussions and comments on versions of this paper. I am also very grateful to the organisers and participants at a number of conferences, including: Predicate Approaches to Modality, Munich; 45th meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, Caltech, Pasadena; Bristol-Leuven conference, Bristol; Logic Seminar, Cambridge; Bristol-München Conference on Truth and Rationality, Bristol.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cotham HouseUniversity of BristolBristolUK

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