Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 47, Issue 5, pp 851–876 | Cite as

Learning Conditional Information by Jeffrey Imaging on Stalnaker Conditionals

  • Mario GüntherEmail author


We propose a method of learning indicative conditional information. An agent learns conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on the minimally informative proposition expressed by a Stalnaker conditional. We show that the predictions of the proposed method align with the intuitions in Douven (Mind & Language, 27(3), 239–263 2012)’s benchmark examples. Jeffrey imaging on Stalnaker conditionals can also capture the learning of uncertain conditional information, which we illustrate by generating predictions for the Judy Benjamin Problem.


Learning conditional information Stalnaker conditional Imaging Douven’s examples Judy Benjamin problem 



Thanks to Hannes Leitgeb, Stephan Hartmann, Igor Douven, and Hans Rott for helpful discussions. Special thanks go to an anonymous referee for very constructive comments. I am grateful that I had the opportunity to present parts of this paper and obtain feedback at the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy (LMU Munich), at the Inaugural Conference of the East European Network for Philosophy of Science (New Bulgarian University), at the International Rationality Summer Institute 2016 (Justus Liebig University), at the Centre for Advanced Studies Workshop on “Learning Conditionals” (LMU Munich), at the University of Bayreuth and the University of British Columbia. This research is supported by the Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Graduate School of Systemic NeurosciencesLudwig-Maximilians-UniversitätMünchenGermany

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