Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 1–16 | Cite as

Relational Semantics and Domain Semantics for Epistemic Modals



The standard account of modal expressions in natural language analyzes them as quantifiers over a set of possible worlds determined by the evaluation world and an accessibility relation. A number of authors have recently argued for an alternative account according to which modals are analyzed as quantifying over a domain of possible worlds that is specified directly in the points of evaluation. But the new approach only handles the data motivating it if it is supplemented with a non-standard account of attitude verbs and conditionals. It can be shown the the relational account handles the same data equally well if it too is supplemented with a non-standard account of such expressions.


Epistemic modals Relational semantics Domain semantics Attitude reports Indicative conditionals 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTufts UniversityMedfordUSA

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