Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 44, Issue 6, pp 713–727 | Cite as

Proof-Theoretic Semantics, a Problem with Negation and Prospects for Modality



This paper discusses proof-theoretic semantics, the project of specifying the meanings of the logical constants in terms of rules of inference governing them. I concentrate on Michael Dummett’s and Dag Prawitz’ philosophical motivations and give precise characterisations of the crucial notions of harmony and stability, placed in the context of proving normalisation results in systems of natural deduction. I point out a problem for defining the meaning of negation in this framework and prospects for an account of the meanings of modal operators in terms of rules of inference.


Proof-Theoretic semantics Harmony Stability Negation Modality 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, BirkbeckUniversity of London,LondonUK

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