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Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 42, Issue 2, pp 409–414 | Cite as

Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism?

  • Carl WagnerEmail author
Article

Abstract

Jonathan Weisberg claims that certain probability assessments constructed by Jeffrey conditioning resist subsequent revision by a certain type of after-the-fact defeater of the reasons supporting those assessments, and that such conditioning is thus “inherently anti-holistic.” His analysis founders, however, in applying Jeffrey conditioning to a partition for which an essential rigidity condition clearly fails. Applied to an appropriate partition, Jeffrey conditioning is amenable to revision by the sort of after-the-fact defeaters considered by Weisberg in precisely the way that he demands.

Keywords

Defeater Holism Jeffrey conditioning Rigidity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsThe University of TennesseeKnoxvilleUSA

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