Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 41, Issue 1, pp 143–172

Global and Iterated Contraction and Revision: An Exploration of Uniform and Semi-Uniform Approaches

Article

Abstract

In order to clarify the problems of iterated (global) belief change it is useful to study simple cases, in particular consecutive contractions by sentences that are both logically and epistemically independent. Models in which the selection mechanism is kept constant are much more plausible in this case than what they are in general. One such model, namely uniform specified meet contraction, has the advantage of being closely connected with the AGM model. Its properties seem fairly adequate for the intended type of contraction. However, the revision operator based on it via the Levi identity collapses into an implausible operation that loses all old information when revising by new information. A weaker version, semi-uniform specified meet contraction, avoids the collapse but has the disadvantage of a remarkably weak logic. It is left as an open issue whether there is an intermediate class of contraction operators that yields a more satisfactory logic.

Keywords

Iterated contraction Iterated revision Specified meet contraction Belief revision Global belief change Global operator 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and the History of TechnologyRoyal Institute of Technology (KTH)StockholmSweden

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