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Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 41, Issue 1, pp 273–286 | Cite as

Impossibility Results for Infinite-Electorate Abstract Aggregation Rules

  • Frederik Herzberg
  • Daniel Eckert
Article

Abstract

Following Lauwers and Van Liedekerke (1995), this paper explores in a model-theoretic framework the relation between Arrovian aggregation rules and ultraproducts, in order to investigate a source of impossibility results for the case of an infinite number of individuals and an aggregation rule based on a free ultrafilter of decisive coalitions.

Keywords

Arrow-type preference aggregation Judgment aggregation Model theory First-order predicate logic Filter Ultrafilter Reduced product Ultraproduct Existential quantifier 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsPrinceton UniversityPrincetonUSA
  2. 2.Institut für Mathematische WirtschaftsforschungUniversität BielefeldBielefeldGermany
  3. 3.Institut für FinanzwissenschaftKarl-Franzens-Universität GrazGrazAustria

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