Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 40, Issue 2, pp 115–120 | Cite as

Notes on the History of Ideas Behind AGM

  • Peter Gärdenfors


Belief revision AGM Theory change Conditionals Rationality postulates 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Lund University Cognitive ScienceLundSweden

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