Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 39, Issue 6, pp 593–616 | Cite as

Explication of Inductive Probability

  • Patrick MaherEmail author


Inductive probability is the logical concept of probability in ordinary language. It is vague but it can be explicated by defining a clear and precise concept that can serve some of the same purposes. This paper presents a general method for doing such an explication and then a particular explication due to Carnap. Common criticisms of Carnap’s inductive logic are examined; it is shown that most of them are spurious and the others are not fundamental.


Inductive probability Explication Carnap 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbanaUSA

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